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We study the tension between ﬁscal decentralization and progressive
taxation. We present a multi-community model in which the local in-
come tax rate is determined by an exogenous progressive tax schedule
and a tax shifter that can diﬀer across communities. The progres-
sivity of the tax schedule induces a self-sorting process that results
in substantial though imperfect income sorting. Rich households are
more likely to locate themselves in low tax communities than poor
households. The actual tax structure is thus less progressive than
the exogenous tax schedule. To investigate the quantitative implica-
tions of our model, we calibrate a fully-speciﬁed version to the largest
metropolitan area in Switzerland. The equilibrium values of the sim-
ulation show the same pattern across communities as we observe in
this area. The theoretical result is challenged by estimating the actual
tax structure faced by the households in this area. We ﬁnd that the
actual tax structure is indeed substantially less progressive than the
ﬁxed tax schedule.
Key words: Progressive Taxation, Fiscal Decentralization, Income Segrega-
tion
‡Department of Economics, email: rhodler@fas.harvard.edu.
§Department of Economics, Braker Hall, Medford, MA 02155, email:
kurt.schmidheiny@tufts.edu.
11 Introduction
In this paper, we study the tension between ﬁscal decentralization and pro-
gressive taxation. We investigate to what extent ﬁscal decentralization re-
duces the progressivity of a common tax schedule in a federation in which
the level of the tax rates can diﬀer across communities. We show that pro-
gressive taxation and ﬁscal decentralization lead to income sorting, which
undermines the progressivity of the tax schedule.
We base our analysis on a multi-community model, in which the income
tax rate is determined by an exogenous progressive tax schedule and a local
tax shifter that can diﬀer across communities. Local tax revenue is used to
ﬁnance a local public good. In the basic version of the model, the mobile
individual households diﬀer only in their incomes.
In equilibrium, no household wants to move, local housing markets clear
and the communities’ budgets are balanced. It follows that the local tax
shifters must be higher in communities in which housing prices are lower.
The progressivity of the tax schedule then induces a self-sorting process that
results in perfect income sorting. Poor households locate themselves in high
tax communities while rich households locate themselves in low tax communi-
ties. Diﬀerent from most of the previous literature,1 sorting is a direct result
of the progressive tax schedule and does not require strong assumptions on
the preferences for either public goods or housing. The spatial segregation
of the population by incomes implies that the actual tax structure must be
less progressive than the exogenous tax schedule if progressive at all.
In an extension, we assume that the individual households diﬀer not only
in their incomes, but also in their preferences for housing. Since each house-
1See e.g. Ellickson (1971), Westhoﬀ (1977), Epple and Romer (1991) and the literature
surveyed in Ross and Yinger (1999).
2hold’s location choice depends now on its income and its preferences, the
income sorting is imperfect in equilibrium: households with the same income
are found in diﬀerent communities, though rich households are still more
likely to locate in low tax communities than poor households.
To investigate the quantitative implications of this model, we calibrate
a fully-speciﬁed version to the Zurich area, the largest Swiss metropolitan
area. Swiss metropolitan areas oﬀer an excellent laboratory for the analysis
of ﬁscal decentralization. In Switzerland, each community can individually
set the level of income taxes by a local tax shifter while the cantons (states)
ﬁx the (progressive) schedule of income taxes. The equilibrium values of this
simulation show the same pattern across communities as we observe in the
Zurich area: A high tax shifter and low average incomes in the center, and
low tax shifters and high average incomes in the fringe.
We then use data on the spatial distribution of incomes in the Zurich area
to estimate the actual tax structure, i.e. average tax rates as a function of
income as faced by the households in this area. We ﬁnd that the actual tax
structure is substantially less progressive than the tax schedule implemented
by the canton because rich households are more likely to live in low tax com-
munities than poor households. This ﬁnding is in line with the predictions
of our theoretical model.
This paper is probably most closely related to Feldstein and Wrobel
(1998), Epple and Platt (1998) and Schmidheiny (2004). Feldstein and Wro-
bel show that a shift in a single US state’s tax progressivity has no redistrib-
utive eﬀects since migration leads to an adjustment of the net wages and the
employment structure. Complementary, we show that migration undermines
the redistributive eﬀect of progressive taxation in presence of ﬁscal decentral-
ization even if wages do not adjust. Our theoretical model shares the formal
3structure with Epple and Platt. Schmidheiny shares the location choice part
of our model and shows empirically that rich households are more likely to
move to low tax communities than poor households.
It is a well known normative principle of the literature on ﬁscal federalism
that income redistribution should be centralized.2 Our paper relates to this
literature as it shows that ﬁscal decentralization undermines the redistribu-
tive eﬀect of progressive taxes.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 brieﬂy informs about ﬁscal
decentralization and progressive taxation in Switzerland. Section 3 presents
the theoretical model and some results concerning the agents’ location choice.
It further proves that an (asymmetric) equilibrium exists. Section 4 presents
the simulation of a fully-speciﬁed version of our model, which is calibrated
to the Zurich metropolitan area. Section 5 estimates the actual tax structure
faced by the households in this area. Section 6 concludes.
2 Fiscal Decentralization and Progressive Tax-
ation in Switzerland
Switzerland is an exemplary federal ﬁscal system. The Swiss federation com-
prises 26 states, the so-called cantons. The cantons are divided into roughly
3000 municipalities of varying size and population. All three state levels ﬁ-
nance their expenditures essentially by their own taxes and fees. The total
tax revenue of all three levels was 93 billion CHF in 2001, of which 46% is im-
posed by the federation, 32% by the cantons and 22% by the municipalities.3
While the federal government is mainly ﬁnanced by indirect taxes (61% of
2See Musgrave (1959) and Oates (1972). For a recent survey of the literature on ﬁscal
federalism see Oates (1999).
3All ﬁgures in this paragraph apply to 2001. Source: Swiss Federal Tax Administration
(2002), ¨ Oﬀentliche Finanzen der Schweiz 2001, Neuchˆ atel: Swiss Federal Statistical Oﬃce.
4federal tax revenue) such as the VAT, the cantons and municipalities largely
rely on direct taxes. Income taxes account for 60% of cantonal and 84% of
municipal tax revenue.
The cantons organize their tax systems autonomously. For example, they
decide upon the level of income and corporate taxes and the degree of tax
progression. The individual municipalities in turn can generally set a tax
shifter for income and corporate taxes. The municipal tax is then the can-
tonal tax rate multiplied by the municipal tax shifter. Federal and cantonal
systems of ﬁscal equalization limit the tax diﬀerences across cantons and
across municipalities within the same canton to some extent, but still leave
room for considerable variation.
The above outlined federal system leads to ample diﬀerences of income
taxes across Swiss municipalities. For example, for a two-child family with a
gross income of 80,000 Swiss francs (CHF) combined cantonal and municipal
income taxes ranged from 3.6% to 11.3% in the year 1997. The federal
income tax for this household was 0.7%. With an income of 500,000 CHF
a two-child family faced much higher tax rates due to the progressivity of
the tax schedules. Combined cantonal and municipal income taxes ranged
from 10.9% to 28.7% for this household and its federal income tax was 9.4%.
Within metropolitan areas the (municipality) tax diﬀerences are smaller but
still diﬀer by a factor of 1.5 in e.g. the Zurich area.
3 The Model
In this section, we introduce and solve the model. After presenting the gen-
eral setting, we characterize the preferences and derive the resulting alloca-
tion of households across distinct communities. We then prove the existence
of an asymmetric equilibrium. Finally, we introduce heterogeneity in the
5preferences and discuss how this aﬀects our results.
3.1 The Setting
Given is a metropolitan area with J communities. This area is populated by
a continuum of households, which diﬀer in their income y ∈ [y,y]. Income
follows a distribution function f(y) > 0.
There are three goods in the economy: private consumption b, housing
h and a local public good g. The housing h is provided by absentee land-
lords, and the housing market is competitive. Hence, the price for housing
pi equates the housing supply HSi with the aggregate housing demand HDi.
We assume that the housing supply HSi = HS(Li,pi,) is a non-decreasing
function of the land area Li and the price pi.
Each community i spends the amount nig to provide the local public good
g, where ni is the measure of households living in community i. The commu-
nities levy income taxes to ﬁnance the public good. In each community i, the
tax rate consists of two parts, a local tax shifter ti and a progressive tax rate
structure r(y). We assume r(y) continuous and increasing in y, r(y) > 0, the
average tax rate t r(y) ∈ [0,1) and the marginal tax rate t[r+yr′(y)] ∈ [0,1).
The quantity of the local public good g and the tax rate structure r(y) are
both exogenous (to the communities) and identical across communities. In
each community i, the tax shifter ti is then determined by budget balance.
Each household can move costlessly and chooses the community maxi-
mizing its utility as place of residence.
3.2 Preferences and Location Choice
The preferences of the households are described by the utility function
U(h,b) , (1)
6where h is the consumption of housing and b the consumption of the private
good. We assume the utility function to be strictly increasing, strictly quasi-
concave, twice continuously diﬀerentiable in h and b and homothetic.4
Households face the budget constraint (omitting community indices)
ph + b ≤ yd = y[1 − t   r(y)] , (2)
where p is the price of housing; the price of the private good is set to unity.
Disposable income yd depends on the local tax shifter t and the tax rate
structure r(y).
Maximization of the utility function (1) with respect to h and b subject
to constraint (2) yields housing demand h∗ = h(p,yd) = h(t,p,y), demand
for the private good b∗ = y(1 − t) − ph(t,p,y), and indirect utility
V (t,p,y) = U(h
∗,b
∗) . (3)
For later use note that V is continuous in t, p and y.
We assume that the elasticity of housing with respect to the disposable





h∗ ≤ 1 for all yd and p. (4)
Next, we present two properties of the households’ indiﬀerence curves
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< 0
4Since the local public good g is constant across communities and not of primary
interest for our considerations, we assume for simplicity that it does not enter the utility
function. Equivalently, we could assume that it enters separably.
7Property 1 follows from the strictly increasing utility function after applying
the implicit function theorem and the envelope theorem. It implies that a
household can be made indiﬀerent towards an increase in the tax shifter t





















> 0 for all y, t and p.
Proof: By assumption, (∂h∗/∂yd)(yd/h∗) ≤ 1. Our assumptions about the
bounds of the average and the marginal tax rate guarantee (∂yd/∂y)(y/yd)
= [1 − tr − tyr′(y)]/[1 − tr(y)] ∈ [0,1). The assumption that r(y) increases
in y, implying ∂r(y)/∂y > 0, concludes the proof. 2
Property 2 implies that the decrease in housing prices p which compen-
sates a household for a higher tax shifter t has to be larger for poor households
than for rich ones.
Given a set of community characteristics, (pi,ti) for i = 1..J, a household
prefers community i if and only if
V (pi,ti,y) ≥ V (pj,tj,y) for all j  = i . (5)
From this, the following proposition directly follows:
Proposition 1 (Order of community characteristics)
If any two populated communities diﬀer in their characteristics (pi,ti), then
the community with the higher housing prices pi must impose a lower tax
shifter ti.
Proof: Suppose the opposite, i.e., that the housing prices pi and the tax
shifter ti are both higher in one community. In this case, no household would
8choose to live in this community (for the same reason that leads to property
1). This is a contradiction. 2
In the remaining part of this section, we show how households allocate
themselves across distinct communities. Distinct communities diﬀer in both
tax shifters and prices. Note that our model allows for groups of communities
with identical community characteristics (ti,pi). Such groups appear as one
community in our notation.
Lemma 1 (Boundary indiﬀerence)
There is a ‘border’ household between any two communities i and j that is
indiﬀerent between these two communities. That is, if a household with in-
come y′ prefers to live in i and another household with income y′′ > y′ prefers
to live in j, then there exists a household with income ˆ yij = ˆ y(pi,ti,pj,tj),
y′ ≤ ˆ yij ≤ y′′, such that V (pi,ti, ˆ yij) = V (pj,tj, ˆ yij).
Proof: Let Vi(y) := V (pi,ti,y) be a household’s utility in i and Vj(y) :=
V (pj,tj,y) in j. The household with income y′ prefers i to j, hence Vi(y′) −
Vj(y′) ≥ 0. The opposite is true for a household with income y′′: Vi(y′′) −
Vj(y′′) ≤ 0. From the continuity of V in y follows the continuity of Vi(y) −
Vj(y) in y. The intermediate value theorem proves that there is at least one
ˆ y between y′ and y′′ such that Vi(ˆ y) − Vj(ˆ y) = 0. 2
Lemma 2 (Two-community income segregation)
Given two populated communities i and j with distinct characteristics (ti,pi)  =
(tj,pj), where ti < tj, then any household in i is richer than any household
in j. That is, if a household with income ˆ y is indiﬀerent between i and j,










Figure 1: Indiﬀerence curves in the (t,p) space
Proof: The proof uses ﬁgure 1, which shows the indiﬀerence curves in the
(t,p)-space for three diﬀerent income levels y′ < ˆ y < y′′. The indiﬀerence
curves represent all (t,p) combinations that households consider as good as
community j’s (pj,tj)-pair. Each household prefers pairs south-west of its
indiﬀerence curve. It follows from property 1 that the indiﬀerence curves
decrease in the (t,p)-space and from property 2 that they become ﬂatter
as income rises. Imagine now a community i, characterized by ti < tj and
pi > pj, where household ˆ y is indiﬀerent to j. All poorer households, e.g. y′,
prefer j to i and all richer households, e.g. y′′, prefer i to j. 2
Proposition 2 (Multi-community income segregation)
Given J populated communities with distinct characteristics (ti,pi), then it
holds for any two communities i and j with ti < tj that any household in i
is richer than any household in j.
Proof: The proposition implies that [y,y] must be partitioned into J
non-empty and non-overlapping intervals. Suppose the opposite, i.e., y′ as
10well as y′′ prefer community i, but y′′′, y′ < y′′′ < y′′, strictly prefers another
community j. Then it follows from lemma 1 that there is a ˆ yij, y′ ≤ ˆ yij < y′′′.
Lemma 2 implies that y′′ > ˆ yij strictly prefers j to i, which is a contradiction.
2
3.3 Equilibrium
In this section, we prove that an asymmetric equilibrium exists. That is, we
show that an allocation in which communities exhibit diﬀerent characteristics
(pi,ti) can be an equilibrium.
An equilibrium requires that each household is located in the community
that maximizes its utility, that each household maximizes its utility within
the given community, that the housing market clears in each community, that
each community has a balanced public budget and that each community has
a positive population.
There always exists a symmetric equilibrium in which all communities
have identical characteristics (pi,ti) and in which the households allocate
themselves such that all communities show the same income distribution.5
However, we are interested in the case in which at least some communities
diﬀer in their characteristics (pi,ti). We therefore show that an asymmetric
equilibrium, i.e., an equilibrium in which (pi,ti)  = (pj,tj) for some i and
j, exists too. For simplicity, we focus thereby on the case of two distinct
communities, 1 and 2.
We assume with no loss of generality that t1 > t2. Hence, any household
in 2 must be richer than any household in 1, as lemma 2 implies. We deﬁne
∆V (ˆ y) = V1(p1(ˆ y),t1(ˆ y), ˆ y) − V2(p2(ˆ y),t2(ˆ y), ˆ y), (6)
5Other equilibria in which all communities have identical characteristics (pi,ti) might
exist as well.
11where pi(ˆ y) and ti(ˆ y) are the equilibrium housing price and the equilibrium
tax shifter, respectively, in i given that households with y < ˆ y live in 1 and
households with y > ˆ y in 2. Hence, Vi(pi(ˆ y),ti(ˆ y), ˆ y) is the indirect utility of
a household with ˆ y in i given this allocation of households.
In addition, we assume:6
(i) The housing supply HS(Li,pi) satisﬁes HS(Li,0) = Li > 0 for i = 1,2.
(ii) The minimum income y > g.
(iii) If hi → ∞, bi > 0, hj < ∞ and bj < ∞, then U(hi,bi) > U(hj,bj).
Proposition 3 (Existence of an asymmetric equilibrium)
There exists an equilibrium in which the communities 1 and 2 exhibit dif-
ferent characteristics, i.e. t1 > t2 and p1 < p2.
Proof: We prove proposition 3 by showing (1) that ∆V (ˆ y) is continuous
and (2) that ∆V (ˆ y) > 0 as ˆ y → y and that ∆V (ˆ y) < 0 as ˆ y → y. It
follows then from the intermediate value theorem that there is at least one ˆ y,
y < ˆ y < y, such that ∆V (ˆ y) = 0. This implies - from the deﬁnition of ∆V -
that the border household ˆ y is indiﬀerent between the two communities, the
prices p1 and p2 clear the local housing markets and the tax shifters t1 and
t2 balance the community budgets.
(1) The equilibrium housing price pi is determined by HS(Li,pi) = HDi.







i and yi are the highest and lowest incomes in community i. The
hereby implicitly deﬁned pi is continuous in yi and y
i given continuity of
6As it will become evident in section 4, these assumptions are suﬃcient, but not nec-
essary for the existence of an asymmetric equilibrium.
12HS( ), h( ) and f( ). The balanced budget requirement and lemma 2 imply














Given continuity of r( ) and f( ), ti is continuous in yi and y
i. Since the indi-
rect utility Vi is continuous in pi, ti and y and since pi and ti are continuous
in y, ∆V (ˆ y) is continuous in ˆ y.
(2) If follows from equations (7) and (9) that HD1 → 0 and n1 → 0
as ˆ y → y. Since assumption (i) guarantees that HS(L1,0) = L1 > 0 (and
since ∂HS(Li,pi)/∂pi ≥ 0), it holds that h∗(p1,t1;y) → ∞ and p1 → 0 as
ˆ y → y. Hence, b∗ → y − g > 0, where the strict inequality follows from
assumption (ii). Assumption (iii) then guarantees that ∆V (ˆ y) > 0 as ˆ y → y.
Analogously, it can be shown that ∆V (ˆ y) < 0 as ˆ y → y.7 2
3.4 Adding Heterogeneous Preferences
So far, we have assumed that households diﬀer only in their incomes y. In
this section, we extend the model by assuming that households diﬀer in their
preferences as well.
The household preferences are now represented by the utility function
U(h,b;α), where the parameter α describes the taste for housing. The higher
α, the more a household is, ceteris paribus, willing to spend on housing.






> 0 for all t, p, y and α. (10)
























Figure 2: Simultaneous income and preference segregation. The areas de-
noted by j = 1,...,J show the attributes of the households that prefer com-
munity j.
Income and preferences are jointly distributed according to the density func-
tion f(y,α).
It follows that income segregation holds, but only within the subpopula-
tion of households with identical preferences. Preference segregation occurs
as well: That is, among the subpopulation of households with the same in-
come y, households with a high α, i.e. a strong taste for housing, tend to
allocate themselves to communities with higher tax shifters ti than house-
holds with a low α.
Simultaneous heterogeneity by incomes and tastes leads to a more re-
alistic pattern of household segregation. Although income groups tend to
gather, the segregation is not perfect. Figure 2 shows the resulting alloca-
tion of household types to communities. The households on the borders are
indiﬀerent between neighboring communities j. Community 1 with the low-
est housing prices is populated by the poorest households with strong taste
for housing, while the richest households with low housing taste are situ-
ated in community J with the lowest tax rate and the highest housing price.
14However, rich households with strong taste for housing prefer lower-priced
communities and poor households with weak taste for housing group with
relatively rich households in the lower-tax communities.
4 A Speciﬁed Version of the Model
To investigate the qualitative and quantitative properties of the model we
construct a fully speciﬁed example in this section. The speciﬁcation is kept
as simple as possible but still captures all mechanisms of the model. The
example is calibrated to the Zurich area, the largest Swiss metropolitan area.
The common tax schedule is taken from Young (1990)
r(y) = r0[1 − (1 + r2 y
r1)
−1/r1].
with parameters r0 > 0, r1 > 0 and r2 > 0. The average local tax rate
tr(y) and the local marginal tax rate t[y ∂r(y)/∂y + r(y)] is increasing in
income y. The marginal tax rate is always above the marginal tax rate; both
asymptotically approach a maximum tr0.




where 0 < α < 1 stands for the taste parameter of the general model. Utility
function and tax schedule satisfy our properties 1 and 2.
The locus of indiﬀerent households between two communities i and j for
any given taste α is
ˆ yij =


















We adopt the housing supply function
HSi = Li(pi)
θ
15Figure 3: Center and periphery in the metropolitan area of Zurich.
from Epple and Romer (1991).8
We calibrate the above outlined model to the metropolitan area of Zurich
in Switzerland. The area around the city of Zurich forms the biggest Swiss
metropolitan area. The city of Zurich has about 330 thousand inhabitants
and is the capital of the canton (state) of Zurich. The canton of Zurich
counts 1.2 million inhabitants in 171 individual communities. As described
in section 2, each of these communities can choose its own tax shifter.
The analysis is restricted to the city of Zurich and a ring of the most
integrated communities around the center. This ring is formed by all com-
munities in the canton of Zurich with more than 1/3 of the working pop-
ulation commuting to the center.9 Figure 3 shows a map with the city of
Zurich and the thus deﬁned ring of 40 communities. This agglomeration is
8Epple and Romer derive this housing supply function from an explicit production
function, where 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1 is the ratio of non-land to land input.
9The number of commuters to the city of Zurich and the size of the working population
in the communities is based on the 1990 Census. This deﬁnition of the urban area is
chosen to justify the model’s assumption that households income is exogenous, i.e. that
they choose their place of residence independent of where they work. It results in a set of
communities closest to the central business district.
16Table 1: Equilibrium values of the speciﬁed model.
homogeneous heterogeneous
preferences preferences
harmonized center periphery center periphery
L: area 1 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.6
p: rent 11.7 6.6 13.1 9.9 12.5
t: tax shifter 1 5.17 0.91 2.30 0.87
n: inhabitants 1 0.12 0.88 0.23 0.77
Ey: mean income 78’547 30’771 85’010 47’755 87’703
The calibrated model parameters: g = 5000, E(lny) = 11.1, SD(lny) = 0.55,
ymin = 23,000, ymax = 500,000, E(α) = 0.25, S.A.(α) = 0 (homogeneous prefer-
ences), S.A.(α) = 0.11 (heterogeneous preferences), θ = 3, r0 = 0.132, r1 = 1 and
r2 = 0.00001.
modelled as two distinct jurisdictions, which we call center and periphery.
The details of the calibration are described in the appendix. The parameters
are summarized at the bottom of table 1.
4.1 Simulated Equilibrium
The equilibrium values pi and ti in both communities satisfy equations (7)
and (8) and guarantee that no households wants to move. As there is no
closed form solution to this nonlinear system of four equations and four
unknowns, we solve numerically for the equilibrium values of the model.10
Table 1 shows in column 2 and 3 the equilibrium values for the case of
homogeneous tastes. There are large diﬀerences in both taxes and prices be-
tween the two communities. The tax rate in the center community is almost
10The aggregation of individual behavior requires double integrals over the community
population. These integrals cannot be calculated analytically. We use Gauss-Legendre
Quadrature with 40 nodes in each dimension to approximate the various double inte-
grals. We numerically solve for the equilibrium values by minimizing the sum of squared
deviations from the equilibrium conditions with the Gauss-Newton method.
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Figure 4: Income and taste segregation in equilibrium. The left ﬁgure shows
the preferred community for all household types. The right ﬁgure shows the
resulting income distributions in both communities.
six times higher than in the periphery while housing prices in the center are
halve the ones in the periphery.11 Households are perfectly segregated: All
households in the high-tax center are poorer than all households in the low-
tax periphery. The mean income in the periphery is therefore almost three
times the mean income in the center. Column 1 in table 1 gives the equilib-
rium values for the hypothetical case that the two communities merged or
harmonized their taxes.
These predictions of segregation and the implied diﬀerences of commu-
nity characteristics are extreme. The consideration of heterogeneous housing
tastes leads to a more realistic situation. Table 1 shows in column 4 and
5 the equilibrium values allowing for heterogeneous tastes. The diﬀerences
between the two communities are still substantial but smaller than with ho-
mogeneous tastes: The center exhibits now 2.5 times higher taxes and 20
% lower housing prices. The left graph in ﬁgure 4 shows the segregation
11The labels ‘center’ and ‘periphery’ are arbitrary. There is always a second equilibrium
with lower taxes in the center.
18Local income tax shifter (1997) Share of households with income











Figure 5: Taxes and incomes in the Zurich metropolitan area.
pattern in the income-taste space. The population is now imperfectly sorted
by incomes: While it is still true that more rich households are found in the
low-tax periphery, rich households with a strong taste for housing prefer the
low-price high-tax center and poor households with a low taste for housing
prefer the periphery. The right graph in ﬁgure 4 shows the resulting income
distributions in the two communities. The mean income in the center is
about half the one in the periphery.
Figure 5 shows the actual local tax levels and the spatial income distri-
bution in the calibrated area. The left map visualizes the considerable tax
diﬀerentials in the Zurich area. The right map demonstrates the striking
relationship between income taxation and spatial income distribution: the
local share of rich households is almost an inverted picture of the local tax
levels.12 Our simple two-community model captures this empirical pattern
12Data from the following sources: Commuter: Swiss Federal Statistical Oﬃce, Census
1990. Tax rates: Statistisches Amt des Kantons Z¨ urich, Steuerf¨ usse 1997. Income distri-
bution: Swiss Federal Tax Administration. Considered are all communities where more
than 1/3 of the working population is commuting to the center community.
19homogeneous tastes heterogenous tastes
























































Figure 6: Mean average tax rate by income in the case of homogeneous (left)
and heterogenous (right) tastes.
well.
4.2 The Resulting Tax Schedule
The average tax rate ti r(y) depends not only on the individual household’s
income but also on its place of residence. As the model shows the place
of residence is not random and rich households are more likely to reside in
low-tax communities. In this section, we ask what tax schedule is realized
after considering the sorting of the population. In other words, we ask what
tax rate a household with income y pays on average.
In the case of homogeneous taste this question is trivial. All households
with income below the indiﬀerent household (ˆ y = 37,000) face the average
tax rate in the high-tax community; rich households the one in the low-tax
community. The left graph in ﬁgure 6 shows the resulting tax schedule.
While progressive within the communities, it is actually regressive as the
richest households face lower average tax rates than the poorest households.





[P(i|y)   ti r(y)], (11)
where ti r(y) is the average tax rate for a household with income y in commu-





is calculated from the income density f(y|i) in community i, the probability
P(i) that an arbitrary household resides in community i and the income
distribution f(y) of the whole area.
In the case of heterogenous tastes, the marginal income distribution f(y|i)
in a community i (shown in the right ﬁgure 4) is calculated by integrating





where αi and αi are the lowest and highest tastes in community i.
The right graph in ﬁgure 6 shows the mean average tax rate in the case
of heterogenous tastes. The realized tax schedule is still progressive, though,
much ﬂatter than the tax schedule implemented by the canton.
5 Evidence
In this section, we estimate the mean average tax rates that households with
a given income face in the Zurich metropolitan area. We then compare our
estimates to the results obtained in the previous section.
5.1 Method
In principle, the mean average tax rate can be estimated from a random
sample of households in the studied area. Knowing each households’ income
21and community tax rate allows to directly estimate the mean average tax rate
with e.g. a kernel regression. The random sampling automatically accounts
for the sorting of the population by incomes. Unfortunately, we do not have
such microdata with tax information. Furthermore, available survey data
suﬀers from small sample sizes and stratiﬁed sampling over communities.
We therefore follow an alternative estimation strategy. The mean average
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As the canton sets the tax structure r(y) and the individual communities
their tax shifters ti, the average tax rate tir(y) for any income y in any
community i is known.
The estimated probability that a household with income y lives in com-
munity i is given by equation (12):
ˆ P(i|y) =







where ni is the known number of households living in community i.
It remains, therefore, estimating the income density ˆ f(y|i) of each com-
munity i in the area. We estimate ˆ f(y|i) from publicly available local income
distribution data. The federal tax administration publishes the number of
households with taxable income in seven diﬀerent income classes.13 We as-
sume that incomes are log-normally distributed and estimate mean and vari-
ance of this distribution using maximum likelihood.14 We estimate a trun-
cated log-normal distribution as the ﬁrst reported income interval is empty
13Swiss Federal Tax Administration, Steuerbelastung in der Schweiz, Nat¨ urliche Perso-
nen nach Gemeinden 1997, Neuchˆ atel: Swiss Federal Statistical Oﬃce.
14Note that this maximum likelihood estimator corresponds to an ordered probit with
known thresholds.
























where µi and σ2
i are mean and variance of log income in community i. sk
is the number of households in income class k with lower interval limit ck ∈
{log(15000),log(20000),log(30000),log(40000),log(50000),log(75000),∞}.
Φ(.) is the cdf of the standard normal distribution. The income density

















Figure 7 shows that the average tax rates that households with income y
face in the Zurich metropolitan area. The top line is the average tax rate
tir(y) of households living in the community with the highest tax shifter.
The bottom line is the average tax rate of households in the community
with the lowest tax shifter. The middle line is the estimated mean average
tax rate that households in this area face, ˆ E[tr(y)|y]. This is the expected
unconditional, i.e. not conditioned on the place of residence, average tax
rate. As one can see, the average poor household faces almost the average
tax rate in the highest-tax community (or in the city of Zurich).15 This is,
of course, because most poor households live in high tax communities. As
households become richer, they live more often in the low-tax communities
and thus face an average tax rate that is on average substantially smaller
than in high-tax communities. The mean average tax rate of households
15The tax shifter is 131 in the highest-tax community and 130 in the city of Zurich.
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Figure 7: Estimated mean average tax rate by income.
with very high incomes y is even relatively close to the average tax rate of
very rich households living in the lowest-tax community.
The results from the estimation (ﬁgure 7) are very similar to the predic-
tions of the calibrated model with taste heterogeneity (ﬁgure 6). There are
though two noteworthy diﬀerences: First, the diﬀerence between the high-
est and the lowest tax shifters is in reality smaller than our model predicts.
Second, the mean average tax rate of very rich households remains in reality
above the average tax rate of very rich households in the lowest-tax commu-
nity, unlike in our simulation. While polito-economical considerations may
account for the ﬁrst diﬀerence,16 the second might indicate that the loca-
tion choice depends also on preference characteristics other than the taste
for housing.
6 Conclusions
We have focused on the tension between ﬁscal decentralization and progres-
sive taxation. We have presented a multi-community model in which the
16The threat of a so-called tax harmonization often prevents low-tax communities from
further lowering their tax shifters.
24local income tax rate is determined by an exogenous progressive tax sched-
ule and a tax shifter that can diﬀer across communities. The progressivity
of the tax schedule has been shown to induce a self-sorting process that re-
sults in substantial though imperfect income sorting. Rich households are
found to be more likely to locate themselves in low tax communities than
poor households such that the actual tax structure becomes less progressive
than the exogenous tax schedule. To investigate the quantitative implica-
tions of our model, we have calibrated a fully-speciﬁed version to the largest
metropolitan area in Switzerland. The equilibrium values of the simulation
have shown the same pattern across communities as we observe in this area.
We have further estimated the actual tax structure faced by the households
in this area. We have found that the actual tax structure is indeed signiﬁ-
cantly less progressive than the ﬁxed tax schedule. Hence, progressive taxes
should be implemented at the state, the national or even the supranational
level rather than at the community level given that one wants them to unfold
their full redistributive eﬀect.
25Appendix: Calibration
Land Area: The whole area has a physical size of 349km2, of which 88km2
(25%) form the city of Zurich. 140km2 are dedicated to development, 53km2
(38%) in the inner city and 87km2 in the fringe communities. In 1998, the
whole area was populated by around 628’000 inhabitants, of whom 334,000
lived in the city and 294,000 in the fringe communities.17 This agglomeration
is modelled as two distinct jurisdictions with land area L1 = 0.4 and L2 = 0.6
respectively.
Tax schedule: The parameters r0 = 0.132, r1 = 1 and r2 = 0.00001 almost
perfectly approximate the tax scheme of the canton of Zurich.18
Income Distribution: The income distribution is calibrated with data
from the Swiss labor force survey.19 The 1995 cross-section contains detailed
information on 1124 households in the above deﬁned region. These house-
holds had average income (after state and federal taxes) of CHF 92,000,
median income of CHF 66,700 and a quartile distance of 47,700.20 We use
a log-normal distribution to approximate this right-skewed distribution. A
log-normal distribution with mean E(lny) = 11.1 and standard deviation
SD(lny) = 0.55 matches the observed median and quartile distance. For
numerical tractability, the model distribution is truncated at a minimum
income of ymin = 23,000 and a maximum income ymax = 500,000.21
Taste Distribution: The Swiss labor force survey also contains the monthly
17Source: Statistisches Amt des Kantons Z¨ urich, Gemeindedaten per 31.12.1998.
18Tax scheme according to Steuergesetz vom 8. Juni 1997.
19Swiss Federal Statistical Oﬃce, Schweizerische Arbeitskr¨ afterhebung (SAKE) 1995.
20State and Federal taxes were deducted from net household income (after social security
contribution) assuming a two-child family.
21The minimum income is subsistence level for a one-person-household as deﬁned by the
Schweizerische Konferenz f¨ ur Sozialhilfe (SKOS) and adjusted for inﬂation. The maximum
income is chosen arbitrarily, but has no inﬂuence on the numerical simulation due to the
low weight on high incomes.
26housing expenditure of renters which allows to calibrate the distribution of
tastes for housing.22 Note that the taste parameter α in the Cobb-Douglas
utility function is the share of housing in a utility maximizing household. We
therefore estimate each household taste parameter as α = (ph)/yd, where ph
is observed households housing expenditure and yd is observed household
income minus federal, state and communal taxes. A beta distribution with
mean E(α) = 0.25 and standard deviation SD(α) = 0.11 describes the dis-
tribution of the so calculated taste parameter well. Taste and income are
assumed to be uncorrelated.
Housing and Public Good Production: The price elasticity of housing
supply is θ = 3 as in Epple and Romer (1991) and Goodspeed (1989). The
targeted public goods provision is set to 5000.
22Of course, there is a selection bias by only considering renters. This seems nevertheless
justiﬁed because the proportion of renters is very high in Switzerland (65% in the data set
used).
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